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The Conception of Abstraction 
 
Alan Bäck, Kutztown University 
SAGP at the Pacific Division, March, 2006 
 
 Philosophers  deal  with abstractions.  Being reflective, they also  have come  up  with 
theories about what these abstractions are. Aristotle is no exception, and indeed gave what came 
to  be a canonical account  of abstraction.1 Here I shal investigate  what  Aristotle thinks 
abstraction is. I shal conclude that Aristotle views abstraction as selective atention. 
 As its very name suggests, abstracting (ἀφαιρέω) consists in taking away something from 
an  object.  The root  verb, αἱρέω, suggests additionaly a sense  of  grasping  or  of choosing,  of 
taking for oneself something of what lies ready to hand.2 
 These lexical meanings leave open a wide range of conceptions of ‘abstraction’. Does the 
abstraction consist in taking out something and discarding the rest? Or does it consist in taking 
away something and keeping what is left? We can cal the first one the selection view, and the 
later the subtraction view. The Greek gives an ambiguity between the two because ‘ἀφαίρεσις’, 
being a  verbal  noun, could  be  derived from the active form ‘ἀφαιρεῖν’,  which  generaly  does 
have the sense  of ‘removal’,  or from the  middle form ‘ἀφαιρείσθαι’,  which  generaly  has the 
sense of ‘take away for oneself’ or ‘steal’. On linguistic grounds of common usage, the selective 
reading of ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ has the advantage, as the middle voice forms are far more common than 
the active voice forms. Yet, as Aristotle is a philosopher, and philosophy stretches or distorts the 
ordinary usage of language, the philological evidence does not setle the issue. For that, we must 
turn to Aristotle’s texts. 
Origins of Aristotle’s Theory 
 Originaly, so some  have speculated,  Aristotle  may  have  developed his conception  of 
abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις) in order to have an alternative to Platonism.3 Such an abstraction theory 
claims to  provide a  way to  distinguish and recognize the  diferent aspects  of things,  both 
universal and (perhaps) singular,  but  without  granting any  of these an independent, substantial 
existence in re, such as  Plato’s theory  of  Forms asserts.  On this account,  we can consider an 
object  with respect to some  of its atributes, take them  out, and thereby create a  new abstract 
thing consisting in that object in only those respects. We can then use this new thing as a subject 
in its own right. Yet we have only one object, the original substance existing in re, although with 
many atributes. In contrast, for  Plato, everything that is a subject in its  own right is an  object 
existing independently. In this  way, the  doctrine  of abstraction lies at the  heart  of  Aristotle’s 
metaphysical enterprise, to construct a theoretical alternative to Platonism.  
 In  Aristotle’s case, there is a  natural  basis for some such abstractions as  opposed to 
others: some are scientific, like  genera and diferentiae;  others are sophistical, like “musical 
Coriscus”. [Metaph. 1026b17-8] In  making the scientific abstractions,  we isolate the  proper 
subjects for the statements being made about real atributes of individual substances. In this way, 
we can start from sense  perceptions  of individuals and arive at sciences  of  universals like 
                              
1 Julius Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison, 1965), p. 5. 
2 LSJ s. v. a¤faire¢w and ai¤re¢w. 
3 Wolfgang Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik (Götingen, 1962), p. 197 n. 12. 
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numbers, plane figures, and motion. Yet we are still talking about the real individual substances, 
not some fictitious, transcendent Forms, existing over and in addition to those individuals.   
 In accord with this approach, Aristotle explains how the universal is abstracted from the 
particular in his account of perception and thought. [An. III.4; Metaph. I.1; Phys. I.1] Likewise, 
he speaks of “cutting off a part of being” and making a science about it. [Metaph. 1003a24-5] 
Physics concerns substances qua movable; geometry considers substances qua figure. [Metaph. 
1026a7-10; 1061a28-1062b11; 1077b22-1078a21] We start with the individual substances given 
in sense perception and then isolate aspects of them, the abstracta, for study in particular 
sciences. 
 Aristotle seems to recognize several types of these abstracta. First, he does clearly 
recognize universals in all the categories. The sciences study universals: not only species and 
genera of substance like dog, rose, plant and animal, but also those from other categories, like 
square, figure, sight, perception, justice and virtue. As items in the categories exist and further as 
the sciences study only things that exist [An. Po. 89b31-5], clearly Aristotle holds these universal 
species and genera to exist in reality. Yet, if Aristotle is to avoid Platonism, it is thereby quite 
likely that he holds these universals, or our knowledge of them, somehow to be abstracted from 
singular things.  
 Second, Aristotle might recognize also singular abstracta, like mathematical objects.4 For 
not only do scientists need to speak of number, triangle, bird, redness, and walking in general. 
They also need to speak of particular instances of ‘two’ in ‘2 + 2 = 4’, of the particular triangles 
used in the diagram of a geometrical proof bisecting a square on the diagonal, and of more than 
one bird in the mating process. The mathematical particulars at least do not seem to be sense 
objects.5  In modern terms, they seem to be tokens of a universal type. In support of this 
interpretation, Aristotle speaks of an intelligible matter and not of perceptible matter, providing a 
basis for having more than a single instance of a type of mathematical object. Thus he seems to 
be indicating that there can be several instances of the same species, differing in number, even 
when there is no corporeal matter to differentiate. [Cf. Metaph. 1036a2-12; 1059b14-6.]6  These 
instances are particulars of some type. For they are composed of matter and form, and, being 
singulars, are not definable. Aristotle seems to state clearly that some mathematical objects are 
individuals. [Metaph. 1036a2-3]  But, if they are singular, they are individuals quite differently 
than the sensible individuals are.7  
 Whether these intelligible particulars be taken as universal or as particular, they are going 
to create complications for a theory of abstraction, especially if the mathematical objects cannot 
be physical, strictly speaking. For a diagram would then be a token of a type of sign signifying a 
                                                            
4 Ian  Mueller, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of Abstraction in the Commentators,” in Aristotle Transformed, ed. R. 
Sorabji (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 463-4.  
5 Although some have argued that Aristotle or some Aristotelian commentators took geometry to be about the 
particular figures and diagrams perceived by the senses. See Mueller’s article for a general discussion. 
6 C. D. C. Reeve, Substantial Knowledge, pp. 62-3, also recognizes both universal and particular intelligible 
matter, which I shall discuss more below. 
7 Unless Aristotle holds that these individuals are abstracted directly from perceptions of individual substances. 
On this account, e.g., when I see a particular bronze sphere, I also upon abstraction have an individual sphere, the 
mathematical object. So too when I see the iron sphere I see another individual sphere. Also, looking at the spheres, 
I have upon abstraction an individual 2, an individual mathematical object. Cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 124,28-125,2. 
Yet, even so, if we are to have items in mathematics for which we have no exemplars in re, such as very large 
numbers or very complex geometrical figures, we still cannot reduce mathematical individuals to perceptible 
individuals. 
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mathematical object. These tokens too have a certain universality: it is not merely the ones here: 
‘2 + 2 = 4’, on this particular page that are being discussed. Rather, when I write that equation, 
the marks on the page are signs not only of themselves but also of some other tokens or token 
types. In order to have that equation, we need two instances of the number two, each represented 
by an instance of the numeral ‘2’. We can then see why Aristotle would think that mathematical 
objects need to have some sort of intelligible matter, in order to have many instances of the same 
species (or type) of number.8 So mathematical objects have special problems, which I shall 
bracket here. Still, clearly Aristotle thinks that they too are “abstracted” from our sense 
experience of the world. 
 Aristotle thinks also that the things thus abstracted are objects existing in re that are in 
some sense independent of our thought. For the universal abstracta include the species and 
genera, the secondary substances that are the objects of science. To be sure, Aristotle does say 
that, if the individual, primary substances did not exist, neither would these secondary substances 
or universal accidents. [Cat. 2b6b-6c] Still, he does not deny that these species and genera exist 
really. So he seems to be saying that these abstract objects exist in re, but not independently of 
and separately from their concrete individuals, the primary substances. Mind (noûs) makes these 
items separate in thought by separating them off from the whole sense perceptions of individuals. 
One might then think that for Aristotle these abstracta are mere concepts, artifacts of the human 
mental process with no real correlates.9 That is, on human, pragmatic grounds, we might focus 
on certain features of individual things in a particular science. Still, such grounds do not give any 
assurance that this science does more than to provide a useful, heuristic model nor that its objects 
have more than a conventional unity. 
 Nevertheless, Aristotle has a different view. As he recognizes that universal substances 
and accidents exist in re, he is assuming that these abstracta have a real basis. In performing at 
least certain abstractions, the scientific ones, we are asserting or presupposing the real existence 
of common structures of individuals in re. In our sciences, we may then be said to be 
“recognizing” (ἀναγιγνώσκειν) certain aspects of real things that apply in fact to more than a 
single individual in a basic sense of the word. That is, we are “re-cognizing”, or representing 
again in thought, what already has a basis to be distinguished in re. A science becomes then 
more than a mere model; it becomes a “theory” (θεωρία) in an original, literal sense: of 
observing or looking at real structures existing in the world.10  
 We have then two basic phenomena or data about Aristotle’s conception of abstraction. 
First, a process of abstraction is not supposed to create or presuppose new objects existing in re 
over and about the individual substances given in sense perception.  Aristotle does not take 
abstract objects to be real objects sui generis. The species man does not exist in re over and 
above the individual human beings. Second, the abstract objects themselves do seem to include 
the universal substances and accidents, the universal species and genera asserted to exist and 
studied by scientists. So, on the one hand, abstract objects are not “real”, and, on the other, they 
are objective.  
                                                            
8 Moreover, as the equation itself can be stated or written in many particular speech acts or writing acts, the 
numeral itself will need to have some way to have many instances, just as we can have many repetitions of the same 
statement (lo¢goV), as when we all utter the same true sentence in a chorus. Yet Aristotle does not seem to pursue 
this issue much, although some medieval Aristotelians like Ockham did, in subdivisions f material supposition.  
9 So J. Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Development of Algebra (Cambridge, Mass, 1968), pp. 
100-13.  
10 Cf. Deborah Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning (Cambridge, 2001), p. 96: “…objects in 
the world…present themselves as concrete individuals and simultaneously as exemplifications of universals.” 
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 We see this tension exemplified in Aristotle’s account of substance in the Metaphysics. 
There again, he does not want the substantial forms to be separate, universal objects, existing 
independently from individual substances. At the same time, he wants them to be “objective”, to 
represent (‘re-present’) structures present in these real individuals, not merely in our 
conventional thought. Aristotle wants objective universal structures but only individuals in re. 
That is, Aristotle takes substantial forms to be abstract objects. Aristotle uses abstraction to 
explain how we can come to know universals from having sense perceptions, to give an account 
of mathematical objects without positing universals in re, and to discuss the universal features of 
what it is to be an individual substance without relapsing, he thinks, into Platonism.  
 These explanations lie at the very core of Aristotle’s thought. Abstraction lies at the very 
core of these explanations. Accordingly, if we can but get clear on the structure of the sort of 
abstraction that he is using, we can gain insight into his theory as well as an increased ability to 
evaluate it. 
The Meaning of ‘Abstraction’ (Ἀφαίρεσις) 
The general discussion so far might suggest thinking of abstraction as extraction. Aristotle does 
speak of “cutting off a part of being” and making a science about it. Such talk suggests that we 
are cutting out, or extracting, certain aspects from the object and erecting them as separate 
objects. Yet this sort of extraction cannot be ‘extraction’ in the usual sense, though. E.g., when I 
“extract” a splinter from my foot, or gold from the ore, I end up with a pair of independent, 
individual substances: the splinter and my wounded foot, and the gold and the slag. If abstract 
objects were “abstracted” in this way, they would indeed have a separate existence over and 
above the individual substances from which they are abstracted.11 Thus Aristotle’s ‘abstraction’ 
would have to be thought of as a type of extraction where the items being extracted do not have a 
separate, independent existence. Consequently, it is not clear how helpful viewing abstraction as 
extraction is.  
 Accordingly, John Cleary has suggested that, rather, Aristotle conceives “abstraction” 
(ἀφαίρεσις) as a process of subtraction.12 Here the individual substance remains, and we merely 
subtract everything that does not pertain to the respects stated.  In support of his view, he notes 
that in the Topics Aristotle contrasts the method of “άφαίρεσις” with that of “πρόσθεσις”, which 
at the time had the common meaning of ‘addition’ in the arithmetical sense. [Top. 118b10-9; 
140a33-b15; 152b10-6] Plato too, he says, seems to use ‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’ in this sense. 
[Phaed. 95C; Euthyd. 296b; Cart. 393d; Prm. 131d; 158c] Aristotle himself contrasts the natural 
scientist’s use of “addition” with the mathematician’s use of “subtraction”. [Cael. 299a14-8; 
Phys. 193b22-194a12; An. 403b9-19; Metaph. 1077b9-11] 
 Indeed, Cleary objects to calling ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ ‘abstraction’ altogether, partly because this 
translation suggests a conception of extraction, and partly because Aristotle does not view the 
process as psychological or epistemological, as in the later discussions of “abstraction” in Locke 
and Berkeley. For on their account of abstraction we make up general concepts or signs for our 
                                                            
11 Theodore Scaltsas, Substance and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Cornell, 1994), pp. 11-2; 34; 116, 
suggest that abstraction generates two objects. However he focuses on the abstraction of matter and form from a 
substance, and there we have a form, capable of definition, and, with the ultimate if not the proximate matter, an 
indefinite stuff. So unlike subtraction abstraction does not yield two equally definite things. 
12 John Cleary, “On the Terminology of ‘Abstraction’ in Aristotle,” Phronesis, Vol. 32 (1985), pp. 18-9; 
Aristotle and Mathematics (Leiden, 1995), pp. 304; 309-14. 
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convenience after having experiences of individual existing in re.13 The things abstracted may 
have use for us but need not reflect real structures in reality: they may be far removed from the 
“secret springs” of physical objects.14 In contrast, Aristotle holds the things abstracted to reflect 
reality. 
 Cleary insists that ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ does not signify the way by which we come to have a 
certain sort of knowledge. Rather, it is the way by which the primary subjects for each science 
are isolated: it is that by which we “chop off a piece of being” so as to make it the proper subject 
of a special science. We do this by subtracting or removing attributes from the totality of those 
constituting an experienced object until we get a primary subject. However, although we do the 
paring down, still the process is not so much a merely psychological process by which we come 
to have perception and science, as an objective process by which we come to be aware of the 
attributes and types of individual substances. That is, although abstraction is a mental process, it 
is grounded upon real distinctions between aspects of things in the world. Other, non-rational 
animals also make abstractions in their sense perceptions, memories, and imaginings, although 
they do not make the ultimate abstractions whereby rational beings can locate the proper subjects 
for science, the universals. Cleary then sees that for Aristotle abstraction proper is primarily an 
ontological process whereby we locate and isolate the primary subjects for each science from our 
perceptions of individual substances with their full array of attributes—not a way by which we 
come to know the objects that we are locating and isolating in a peculiarly human, conventional 
way of knowing.15  
 Cleary’s main evidence for Aristotle’s not viewing ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ as an epistemological 
process whereby we acquire knowledge of objects lies in this passage: 
Now it is also evident that, if some [type of] perception is lacking, it is necessary also that some [type of] 
knowledge is lacking, if indeed we learn either by induction or by demonstration, where demonstration is 
from the universals and induction from the particulars, and it is impossible to contemplate the universal if 
not through induction (for since also those said from abstraction will be able to be made familiar through 
induction, because [or: that16] some things belong to each genus, even if not separate, qua each such thing 
[sc., the genus]), it is impossible for those who do not have the [type of] perception to make the induction 
[literally: be led to, sc., have the induction made for them]. For perception is of the singulars: for it is not 
possible to take knowledge of them: for neither from the universals without induction, nor through 
induction without perception. [An. Po. 81a38-b9]  
The main points of the passage are clear: we have no acquaintance with singulars except through 
sense perception.  We may then come to become acquainted with universals through induction 
on the singulars once acquired.17 Then we may come to have knowledge of universals through 
performing demonstrations on these universals. So all knowledge comes from, or depends upon, 
sense perceptions, directly or indirectly. [Eth. Nic. 1139b27-31] As Cleary stresses, Aristotle 
does not say here that we perceive or know anything through abstraction. Rather, we come to 
grasp “even the things said from abstraction” through induction.  Consequently, abstraction 
                                                            
13 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II11.9; IV.7.9; Berkeley, Principles of Human 
Knowledge, Introduction §§15-6. 
14 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, V.1. 
15 Cleary, Aristotle and Mathematics, p. 308. His account agrees mostly with Jonathan Lear, “Aristotle’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics,” Philosophical Review Vol. 91 (1982), p. 168. 
16 I agree with Cleary, “On the Terminology of ‘Abstraction’ in Aristotle,” p. 15, that either translation is 
possible. 
17 Jonathan Barnes, trans. & comm., Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, First Edition (Oxford, 1975), p. 161, notes 
that Aristotle claims here only that induction can make abstractions familiar to us, not that it alone can do so. He 
claims that Aristotle argues for that stronger claim at An. 432a3-6.  
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appears to be a process different from induction or demonstration.  Its products are “the things 
said from abstraction”. [81b3]  
 This phrase (τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόµενα ἔσται δι’ ἐπαγογῆς γνώριµα ποιεῖν [81b3]). may 
appear ambiguous: it may signify what is said from abstraction, sc., statements made as a result 
of abstraction, or the objects that we are now able to talk about as a result of the abstraction. Yet 
the dilemma of: words or objects? is misleading. For, as I have argued elsewhere, as Aristotle 
wants in his scientific language, an isomorphism between the words and the objects, what is said 
will match the actual properties of those objects. So we may as well take the phrase realistically, 
to mean the objects signified by such subject terms as ‘triangle’ and ‘sphere’. Indeed, as Aristotle 
takes “the things said from abstraction” to provide the objects for the mathematical sciences, and 
science concerns only what exists in re, he is committed to a realistic views of these things. 
Accordingly, I shall henceforth call the “things said by abstraction” ‘abstract objects’. 
 Also, we might see two possible ways of understanding ‘from’ (ἐκ) in “the things said 
from abstraction”. On one reading, we would be inventing abstract objects, by treating aspects of 
real objects as if they were real, independent objects, without their really existing as such. On 
another reading, we would be discovering real abstract objects. The former gives a nominalist 
reading; the latter a Platonist. As Aristotle insists that he rejects Platonist accounts of abstract 
objects, like the objects of mathematics, we should take the first reading. Yet, given that 
Aristotle speaks of cutting off parts of being and of secondary substances existing in their own 
right, he does seem to want these abstracta to be extracted so as to constitute independent 
objects, albeit derivative, dependent ones.  So the nominalism will be a “realistic” nominalism.  
 Aristotle has what I shall call a transcendent sort of abstraction. For the abstraction goes 
beyond the original objects perceived so as to generate, or at any rate to recognize, new objects. 
We perceive individual things and then via abstraction are able to know the universal objects of 
mathematics. These new objects have quasi-independence if not a real independence. For, as 
they serve as the objects of the sciences, they are the most intelligible objects of the things that 
are. Abstract terms are more than mere façons de parler.  
 Aristotle says here that these abstract objects become familiar to us through induction. 
Induction is a process whereby simple apprehension, via noûs, of the things apprehended is 
achieved. [An. Po. 100b3-15] So we become directly acquainted with these objects apprehended 
by induction. Then induction makes us able to apprehend and know abstract objects. The 
abstraction would have to serve a function other than enabling us to apprehend abstract objects, 
as Cleary maintains.  
 Aristotle implies at 81b4-5 (whether we take the ‘ὅτι’ at 81b4 to indicate the reason or to 
indicate the content of what has become familiar to us) also that each genus has some of the 
things said by abstraction given by induction. An abstract object belongs to a genus not in the 
way that a separate thing, sc., an individual substance, does. Rather each belongs to one “qua 
each such thing,” i.e., qua itself. [81b5] Thus number belongs to discrete quantum and to 
quantum qua number; likewise number belongs to two qua two, or to two per se (καθ’ αὑτό), 
qua number. Neither numbers nor even individual numbers exist in re as separate substances. 
Still, we may legitimately treat them as if they were separate individuals and put them under a 
genus, so as to have a science of arithmetic. 
Posterior Analytics I.18 does then give us strong grounds not to view abstraction as a merely 
psychological process. It also gives us strong grounds not to identify abstraction with induction. 
Yes it does not follow, as Cleary seems to say, that the induction is not a type of abstraction. It 
could be that induction is one application of a process of abstraction, where abstraction could 
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have other applications. This text by itself does not resolve this issue.  For instance, take 
induction as the process whereby the universals arise from the relevant singulars, and the 
abstraction used to generate the abstract, proper objects of mathematics as the process whereby 
universals inseparable in re in the individual substance and even in intellectu initially come to be 
treated as if they were separate. E.g., we might start off with individual physical objects and then 
via induction come to the general concept of body. Such a body would have color and shape (in 
general). Yet we may then “abstract” and treat the color and the shape as if they were separate, 
even though these universals necessarily go together. A non-rational animal could not make the 
final abstraction, Aristotle might say, although it can have experience and general notions 
(“primitive universals” as in Phys. 184a24-5; An. Po. 100a16) via some less ultimate processes 
of abstraction. 
 Again, should we agree with Cleary and translate ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ as ‘subtraction’? This 
translation has the advantage that we can see the parallel with ‘addition’ clearly. Cleary seems to 
dislike the use of ‘abstraction’ because it, like ‘extraction’, suggests that the item to be abstracted 
already lies there ready to hand, and needs be only plucked out, like a raisin in a pudding. Rather, 
we should understand ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ to indicate a process whereby we take the object and pare 
away, or subtract, attributes until we arrive at the abstract object desired. 
 I see several problems with this approach. First, as we do not know all the items to be 
subtracted, the analogy with mathematical subtraction breaks down. I can fix upon only the 
numerical or geometrical attributes to an individual substance by stipulating, ‘qua number’ or 
‘qua shape’. I do not thereby list all the items to be subtracted and then see what is left. The 
process of subtraction generates two things, two numbers, the number subtracted and the 
remainder, each of which can be known determinately. In contrast abstraction generates one 
abstract object and an indefinite residue.18  
 Again, taking the abstraction process as one of subtraction or paring away makes an 
individual substance something like an uncarved block, ready to be shaped according to the 
whim of the sculptor. Yet Aristotle seems to view the abstract objects apprehended to have a real 
basis in the individual substance. For science is of real beings. Remember that Aristotle holds 
that both individuals and universals exist in re. For he says that both the primary substances and 
the secondary substances, the universal substances, exist in re. To be sure, he does say that the 
existence of the latter depends on the existence of the appropriate singular substances, which are 
primary. Still the universal substances exist nonetheless. Likewise, Aristotle admits that 
universal accidents exist. Apart from saying so in the Categories, Aristotle needs them in order to 
have science. For propria and differentiae are in accidental categories, and these per se 
accidents, along with substances, serve as the main items discussed in science.19 
 Consequently, the ‘subtraction’ interpretation has its problems too. Just as Aristotle 
appropriates many geometrical terms in his theory of syllogistic (like ‘term’ and ‘figure’) and 
demonstration, but uses them differently or at any rate extends their usage, so too he may be 
doing likewise in his use of ‘ἀφαίρεσις’. I am inclined to admit that ‘άφαίρεσις’ does end up 
having the negative function or result of eliminating, or paring away, all those attributes that do 
not agree with the aspect specified. Yet we need not do this in advance. Rather, we subject the 
                                                            
18 Theodore Scaltsas, Substance and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Cornell, 1994), pp. 11-2; 34; 116, 
suggest that abstraction generates two objects. However he focuses on the abstraction of matter and form from a 
substance, and there we have a form, capable of definition, and, with the ultimate if not the proximate matter, an 
indefinite stuff. So unlike subtraction abstraction does not yield two equally definite things.  
19 On the status of differentiae and propria, see Bäck. On Predication, pp.  . 
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predications presented to a test, namely whether they agree with the aspect specified. Then, if 
they pass that test, we admit them into this particular scientific discourse; if they do not pass, 
then we eliminate or “subtract” them. However, unlike arithmetical subtraction, we need not 
specify, in advance or all at once, all the predications, all the items to be removed. We need only 
to look at those attributes of which we have come to be aware, and require that those that do not 
pass the test of relevance be excluded. We need not “subtract” all possible irrelevant attributes. 
Accordingly, I shall opt for the traditional translation of ‘abstraction’ for ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ to signify a 
process sui generis. Too, although we do not have the same problem, of not being able to specify 
all the objects to be added, perhaps it is best, to emphasize that the mathematical use is only an 
analogy, also to translate ‘πρόσθεσις’ not as ‘addition’ but as ‘combination’ or ‘synthesis’.20  
I do concede, however, that at times Aristotle does use ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ in the sense of mathematical 
subtraction. [E.g., Metaph. 1061b20; 1023b13-5; 1024a27]. Here we can indeed think of 
abstraction as removal. [Cf. (ps.) Alexander, in Metaph. 427,18.]  (Ps.) Alexander suggests that 
‘ἀφαίρεσις’ means subtraction in the category of quantum strictly speaking but only 
metaphorically so in other categories. [in Metaph. 423,36-9] Perhaps this is the solution. For the 
mathematical conception of subtraction applies in full force only to quantities. To avoid 
ambiguity I think it better not to have two uses of the same term, and so will continue to call the 
non-quantitative “subtraction” ‘abstraction’.  
Abstraction as Selective Attention 
 In order to mark off an abstract object, like ‘two’ or ‘number’, we must be able to specify 
the aspect that we wish to separate off. We specify an aspect like number so as to generate 
abstract objects.  We then look at our sense perceptions, examine the phenomena, to see what 
content they have under this aspect. As Lear puts it, we “filter” our experience in order to get at 
what we have chosen to find relevant. We do not invent the phenomena, but do choose what we 
want to notice. Hence I suggest conceiving abstraction as selective attention.21 
 Construing abstraction as selective attention has the advantage of unifying the two 
different sorts of abstraction that Alain de Libera finds in Aristotle: 1) the sort in the 
mathematical sciences, of taking the form from the matter [in effect, what I have called 
‘extraction’] and 2) subtracting as opposed to adding on attributes.22 Selective attention performs 
both functions. 
 Likewise, taking abstraction as selective attention provides a common basis for the 
different views about Aristotle’s theory of mathematical objects distinguished by Mueller.23 It 
leaves open the question whether the abstracta are universal or singular (or even some other 
                                                            
20 C. D. C. Reeve, Substantial Knowledge (Indianapolis, 2000), p. 40, translates ‘πρόσθεσις’ as “positing”, 
with “abstraction” for ‘ἀφαίρεσις’. But this seems too far removed from the mathematical background of the two 
terms. 
21 C. C. Taylor, “Berkeley’s Theory of Abstract Ideas,” Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28 (1978) claims that 
Locke takes abstraction to be selective attention. Kenneth Winkler, Berkeley (Oxford, 1989), pp. 40-2, denies this 
claim, but then argues that Berkeley “discovered” the view that abstraction is selective attention. Robin Rollinger, 
Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals (Amsterdam, 1993), p. 13 n. 21, has likewise used ‘selective 
attention’ to characterize Meinong’s view, although not in the same sense.  
This interpretation of Aristotle would make him fit in not too badly with work on perception and cognition in 
modern psychology. See, e.g., Dana Ballard, “On the Function of Visual Representation,” in Perception ed. K. Akins 
(Oxford, 1996), p. 116-9. 
22 Alain de Libera, L’art des généralités (Paris, 1999), p. 30. 
23 Ian Mueller, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of Abstraction in the Commentators,” pp. 464-5.  
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option24). It allows for mathematical objects’ being either abstracta of the physical objects 
themselves, as Lear and Cleary take them, or of certain features of extension as such, underlying 
physical objects, as in Mueller’s view.25 For this pure extension itself would be an abstractum, 
on which we then perform another abstraction operation. Indeed, we can classify these different 
interpretations according to what the abstraction is performed upon and what features are being 
abstracted. 
 Thinking of abstraction as selective attention has another advantage. For it gives the 
intellect, and even the sense organs, an active role in locating these structures in its sense 
experience: it must “attend” to those features. Still, as I shall stress below, selective attention 
need not be a self-conscious, deliberate process. View ‘attention’ then as a sort of ‘aiming at’. 
Aristotle himself seems to have this sort of conception when he attributes ὄρεξις to all animals 
able to perceive and imagine. [An. 413b23] We can translate ‘ὄρεξις’ as ‘desire’, but only 
‘desire’ in a basic sense in which all animals can be said to “desire” food when they move 
towards a source of food. I mean ‘attention’ in the definition of ‘abstraction’ in this way too. 
Again, selectivity also need not imply any sort of deliberation or even of thought. Indeed, the 
sense organs themselves interact with the environment so as to be responsive to only certain 
types of stimuli as input. So they respond to stimuli “selectively” without any consciousness or 
choice being required.26 (Likewise in modern science particles respond selectively to different 
sorts and quanta of forces.) This interpretation will fit nicely with Aristotle’s psychology, 
particularly with the recursive abstractions constituting the perceptual and cognitive processes.  
As opposed to the modern empiricists, Aristotle does not view abstraction as a merely human 
psychological operation. To be sure, he takes abstraction to be a psychological operation. Still 
for him psychological operations are just as real as other natural operations. So too Aristotle puts 
perception and knowledge in the same category as colors and shapes. For Aristotle we shall see 
abstraction naturalized. To this extent we can agree that Aristotle holds human mental experience 
is the mirror of nature: it is not mirror but part of nature. Yet, as it is a part of nature, it will 
reflect, and reflect upon, other natural phenomena. 
John N. Martin claims that in antiquity abstraction (‘άφαίρεσις’) in the general sense has 
two aspects: it conserves something while taking something else away. He goes on to claim that 
‘ἀφαίρεσις’ came to acquire two special meanings: roughly, one Aristotelian and one Platonist: 
the former consisting in the process of subtraction, or, as I prefer to think of it, in selective 
attention; the latter in the inverse relation of construction.  
 Martin takes Aristotle to have a specialized sense of abstraction as concept formation, 
which is vaguer than the general one, as Aristotle has no theory of conceptual abstraction.27 
However, he says, Porphyry and Boethius made the process explicit. I would say that that 
Aristotle’s commentators were merely restating his views—as Martin himself goes on to imply. 
Moreover, so I shall be arguing (elsewhere), Aristotle takes both mathematical abstraction and 
                                                            
24 As discussed above re types and tokens.  
25 “Aristotle on Geometric Objects,” in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 3, ed. J. Barnes et al. (London, 1979). 
26 Of course, in the case of animals, certain types of selective attention may require consciousness. My 
conception of selective attention agrees with Victor Caston, “Aristotle on Consciousness,” Mind, Vol. 111.4 (2002), 
p. 759. “…Aristotle cannot plausibly mean that animals are continually aware of such changes as a result of 
deliberately observing them and directing their intention towards them.” I.e., not introspection; rather: “not 
unaware” [Phys. 244b12-245a2; cf. 437a26-9; 447a15-7] in “an unobtrusive way”.  
27 So too Leen Spruyt, “Agent Intellect and Phantasms,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction 
and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 126-7. 
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conceptual abstraction as different applications of the abstraction operation, for which Aristotle 
does offer a theory. 
Martin claims that Plotinus and Proclus, following the Pythagoreans and Plato, have a different, 
special sense of ‘abstraction’. In their ontology they construct the more complex things from the 
more basic ones, ultimately the One, by adding features on to it.28 Martin holds that going in 
reverse, so as to break down composites would be subtraction or ἀφαίρεσις.  
Abstraction is the epistemic converse of the process of physical composition…the mental process of 
reversion to the One. Ontologically, the Chain of Being proceeds downwards through the process of 
causation, but the Understanding remounts backwards from the bottom to the top. The process of 
remotion is called abstraction.29  
Martin does not want to attribute the mathematical or Aristotelian sense of abstraction to Plotinus 
on account of the standard Hegelian complaint that then the One, arrived at via abstraction, 
would have less content than the beings emanating from it.30 Rather, the One is the set of all 
things, with the things emanating from it its “smaller effect sets”.31  
I see some problems with Martin’s claim that the Platonists had another conception of 
‘ἀφαίρεσις’. First, he offers little textual support in favor of this view re the occurrences of 
‘ἀφαίρεσις. What textual support there is can be explained by the general, mathematical use of 
‘ἀφαίρεσις’, common to both Platonists and Aristotelians, where ‘ἀφαίρεσις’ just means 
subtraction, contrasted with addition. It’s just that what is left for the Platonists once the 
differentiations and divisions of the lower genera are removed is a whole or One embracing them 
all. Moreover, ‘ἀνάλυσις’ in the Prior Analytics etc. seems to mean what Martin is taking 
‘ἀφαίρεσις’ to mean. Alexander of Aphrodisias says that “analysis is the rendering of every 
composite into its highest principles, and is the way back to the highest principles from the last 
conclusions.” [in An. Pr. 7,14-8] Second, Martin gives a false etymology for ‘ἀφαιρέω’: as 
coming from ‘φέρω’, while in fact it comes from ‘αἱρέω’, ‘to take’ or ‘to choose’.
32
  
 Francesco Coniglione has a much more convincing account of the difference between 
Platonist and Aristotelian abstraction:
33 Unlike Aristotle, Plato did not derive universals as 
common elements from perceptions of individuals. For Plato abstraction is the process of leaving 
out all the imperfections of the exemplars of Forms and ascending to the Forms themselves. 
[Resp. 525c] Abstraction thus becomes a purifying, intellectual process for apprehending Forms 
via being reminded of them by sense perception. The Forms themselves are causal principles 
governing the behavior of their instances. In contrast, Aristotle denies that mathematics can be 
applied to astronomy. [Cf. Metaph. 997b]  In the modern period, scientists like Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton returned to Platonism so as to construct idealized objects like point 
masses and frictionless bodies by which to formulate laws of nature.34 “Only by creating 
fictitious, ideal entities and then descending from them by means of experiment and 
approximation to the “roughness of experience” is it possible to combine mathematics and 
                                                            
28 John N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, (Hampshire, 2004), pp. xi-xiii; 37-9. 
29 John N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, (Hampshire, 2004), p. 163. 
30 John N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, (Hampshire, 2004), pp. 40; 115 n. 58. 
31 John N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, (Hampshire, 2004), p. 45. 
32 John N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic, p. xiii n. 8. 
33 Francesco Coniglione, “Between Abstraction and Idealization,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on 
Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 70-80.  
34 Cf. Ernst McMullin, “Galilean Idealization,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Vol. 16 
(1985); Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination (Princeton, 1986), p. 89. 
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reality.”35 Later philosophers took up this conception: Descartes and Leibniz (despite their 
protests), Hegel, Cassirer, Lotze, Husserl.36 
 On Coniglione’s account Aristotle and Plato do not have difference conceptions of 
abstraction proper. In both cases we have selective attention: some things are selected; others 
omitted. Rather, they differ in what they take to be the results of the abstraction process: on the 
one hand, universals; on the other, reminders of universals.  
Despite the differences between Platonic and Aristotelian uses of abstraction, we can find 
both uses of ‘abstraction’ in Aristotle anyway. Abstraction as selective attention concerns the 
process whereby the abstracta are generated; the abstracta themselves are “ideal objects”. In 
constructing a universal from singulars, Aristotle at best has to go with what holds for the most 
part, and ignore im-perfections etc. He comes up with his universal species, genera, properties, 
principles from what holds for the most part. Aristotle somehow gets to perfect geometrical 
shapes and lines, which have no instances in the actual things in re.37  
 When we look in detail, so far as possible, at how Aristotle views universals to be 
constructed, we shall then find Aristotle having a view of abstraction as selective attention where 
the content is somewhat idealized: its imperfections stripped away.  
 Let me close by mentioning other conceptions of abstraction current today. I have already 
mentioned the modern empiricist way, of using abstraction pretty much like Aristotle except for 
restricting it to the psychological and withholding it from the ontological.  
 Another usage distinguishes ‘abstraction’ from ‘exclusion’. Thus Descartes says:  
There is a great difference between abstraction (abstraction) and exclusion (exclusion). If I said 
simply that the idea of which I have of my soul does not represent it to me as being dependent on 
the body and identified with it, this would be merely an abstraction, from which I could form only 
a negative argument which would be unsound. But I say that the idea represents to me as a 
substance which can exist even though everything belonging to the body be excluded from it, from 
which I form a positive argument, and conclude that it can exist without the body.38  
This abstraction amounts to the Aristotelian conception though. Abstract objects for Aristotle do 
not exist independently from their bases as separate substances. Descartes has introduced 
‘exclusion’ for “abstract” objects that are such separate substances. Some later philosophers like 
Stout have similar views.39 
                                                            
35 Francesco Coniglione, “Between Abstraction and Idealization,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on 
Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 72. 
36 G. Hegel, Science of Logic, Werke, Vols. 5-6 (Frankfurt, 1969), pp. 258-9; E. Cassirer, Substance and 
Function, and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, trans. W. & M. Swabey (Chicago, 1923), Chapter I; Determinism and 
Indeterminism in Modern Physics, trans. O. Benfay (New Haven, 1956), p. 83; E. Husserl.,Logical Investigations, 
Vol. 1, trans. J. Findlay (London, 1970), II; Lotze, Logik (Leipzig, 1880), §14; pp. 151-2. Cf. Francesco Coniglione, 
“Between Abstraction and Idealization,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. 
Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 81-2; Robin Rollinger, “Hermann Lotze on Abstraction 
and Platonic Ideas,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, 
& R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 151-2. 
37 Alexander, in Metaph. 52,15-25; Mueller, “Aristotle on Geometric Objects,” in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 3, 
ed. J. Barnes et al. (London, 1979), p. 465. 
38 “Letter to [Mesland],” May 2, 1644 [AT, Vol. IV, p. 120; CSM, p. 236]. Cf. Justin Skirry, “Descartes's 
Conceptual Distinction and its Ontological Import,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 41.1 (2003). 
39 G. F. Stout, “Alleged Self-Contradictions in the concept of Relations, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. 2 1901-2, p. 13. Cf. Maria van der Schaar, “The Red of a Rose,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies 
on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 208.  
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 Another, more modern usage, aggravating and documented by Angelelli, makes 
‘abstract’ amount to ‘incorporeal’ or ‘universal’: not existing in space-time.40 This use seems to 
have its roots in the Platonist, idealized sense of ‘abstraction’, but has now lost the Platonism and 
assumed, explicitly or implicitly, a materialism or a positivism. Thus the ideal objects, 
particularly those used in scientific theory, no longer are taken as more real than their exemplars, 
but rather are taken as mere shadows of them or heuristic devices for our knowledge of them. All 
it would take to give ‘abstract’ this sense is for people to take the Platonist, idealizing usage of 
abstraction and to add on a materialist attitude that only physical singulars accessible to sense 
perception have reality in the robust sense. 
 Frege has not only (1) the traditional, Aristotelian use of ‘abstraction’ but also two 
more.41 (2) He suggests but finally rejects definition by abstraction. Here a term is introduced in 
the context of an equivalence relation, of the form of Hume’s Law: if we have a relation ‘Φ(ξ,ζ)’ 
that is commutative and associative then we can write instead of it ‘§ξ, = §ζ’.42 To use the classic 
example from the Grundlagen: the number of F’s ↔ the number of G’s iff the F’s and the G’s 
are equinumerous:43 The point is that the term introduced, ‘§’ or ‘number’, is completely 
uninterpreted. Its only content comes from this equivalence, the “definition by abstraction”. So 
then we “look around” and see if we can use the term in some interpretation useful to us.44 Frege 
ended up rejecting this method because it leaves the term completely undefined for things that 
cannot be put into the equivalence. This is the Caesar problem: in the definition of ‘number’, as 
Caesar cannot be put into the relation of equinumerosity, it is left open whether Caesar is or is 
not a number. So we cannot rule out that Caesar is a number and hence whether we are right in 
our interpretation for ‘number’ when the domain is our ordinary world.45 
Frege also discusses and ridicules (3) a “magical” sort of abstraction, where different things are 
made identical by abstracting away all their differences. He was objecting here to 
mathematicians like Cantor and Ballue, who wanted to generate a set of identical units to use as 
                                                            
40 Ignacio Angelelli, “Frege and Abstraction,” Philosophia Naturalis, Vol. 21 (1984), p. 462: Ignacio Angelelli, 
“Adventures of Abstraction,” in Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. 
Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 18-25. 
41 Ignacio Angelelli, “Frege and Abstraction,” p. 459; “Adventures of Abstraction,” in Idealization XI: 
Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 
17. 
42 Gottlob Frege, “Letter to Russell,” July 28, 1902, in Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (Hamburg, 1976), 
quoted in Angelelli, “Frege and Abstraction,” p. 458. 
43 Grundlagen, Second Edition, ed. & trans. J. L. Austin (Oxford, 1953), p. 56. 
44 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago, 1956), pp. 1; 117; Ignacio Angelelli, “Abstraction, 
Looking-around and Semantics,” Studia Leibnitiana, Vol. 8 (1979), pp. 108-23.  
45 Grundgesetze, Vol. 1 §10; Grundlagen, §§55-6; 65.  Cf. Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), p. 402: “Frege has laid down that the value-range of a function f is the same 
as that of a function g...just in case f and g have the same value for every argument.” Frege then says that this does 
not suffice “to determine uniquely the reference of every value-range term.” “...for an object not given as a value-
range, we have no means of deciding whether it is a value-range ...”   
Frege’s method of definition by abstraction is having a current renaissance though. Cf. Kit Fine, The Limits of 
Abstraction (Oxford, 2002); the articles by Fine and Wright in Matthias Schirn, The Philosophy of Mathematics, 
(Oxford, 1998); Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen, 1983); Crispin Wright, “0n 
the Philosophical Significance of Frege's Theorem,” in Heck, 1997, pp. 201-244; Crispin Wright, “Is Hume's 
Principle Analytic?,” repr. in M. Schirn, ed.:, Frege: Importance and Legacy, (Berlin, 1996). 
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numbers.46 He goes so far as to style this sort of abstraction as a miraculous divine force, 
“Shiva”, beyond the comprehension of ordinary mortals.47  
For Frege “ordinary abstraction” (1) consists in comparing objects and taking the ones in 
which they agree so as to arrive at a concept under which all the individuals fall, “Now this 
concept has neither the properties abstracted from nor those common to” the individuals.48 So 
too the concept ‘female mammal’ does not bear young or give milk, although the objects that are 
female mammals do.  
In contrast, the “divine” abstraction (3) sticks to the level of the original individuals, but 
takes them now as stripped of some of those properties. Frege ridicules this sort of procedure 
often.49 He criticizes Husserl for using a type of numerical abstraction that makes “things 
absolutely identical without changing them.”50 But, Frege insists, this is possible only in “the 
washtub of the mind”. He objects that “the way of considering an object, and the abstractions 
performed in the mind of a subject, seem to be being taken for qualities of the object.”51 If we 
consider Jupiter, he says, as an isolated object, it still does not lose its shape, mass or 
gravitational relations. It would be silly, he says, to think that the mental act of abstraction 
creates a new object, an impoverished Jupiter if you like.52 So too he writes,  
By abstraction the logician acquires the concept pea, and to him it does not usually matter 
whether he has a handful more or less. The individual peas remain completely unchanged in the 
process and are not thereby transformed into the concept pea or replaced by it, but continue to 
exist beside it. The present process is much more marvelous: each individual pea divests itself 
entirely of its nature as a pea, but—and this is the most marvelous part--continues nevertheless to 
have a shadowy being separate from its fellow peas and without fusing with them.53 
Frege objects that the abstract peas, now stripped of all difference, have no right to claim any 
plurality of objects. Rather what is abstracted is the general concept of pea. 
I have described Frege’s views in some detail because they have some relevance to how 
we understand Aristotle. Aristotle insists that we are not creating transcendent, magical objects 
via abstraction. When the geometer abstracts from physical objects to consider them only as 
spheres and lines, she is not creating new individual substances, Aristotle says. Yet she is 
treating them “as if” they were independent substances. Moreover, the objects so considered are 
hypostasized so as to be subjects and not, as with Frege’s reputable abstraction (1), unsaturated 
concepts of objects (in the formal language: predicate functions of individual constants). That is, 
                                                            
46 Claire Ortiz Hill, “Abstraction and Idealization in Husserl and Cantor prior to 1895,” in Idealization XI: 
Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization, ed. F. Coniglione, R. Poli, & R. Rollinger (Amsterdam, 2004), 
pp. 222-3; 234. 
47 “Draft Towards a Review of Cantor’s….” in Posthumous Writings, ed. H. Hermes et al. (Chicago, 1979), p. 
69.  
48 “Draft Towards a Review of Cantor’s….” in Posthumous Writings, p. 71. 
49 “Review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic,” in Collected Papers, ed. B. MacGuiness (Oxford, 1984), 
pp. 204-5 (also in Kleine Schriften, ed. I. Angelelli (Hildesheim, 1967).  
50 Husserl claims to base number on a type of abstraction different from Locke and Aristotle: we get concept 
of a number from taking a set of like elements and retaining each “only insofar as it is a something…” Husserl, 
Philosophie der Arithmetik (The Hague, 1970), pp. 88-92; 165-6; “On the Concept of Number,” in Husserl: Shorter 
Works, ed. P McCormick & F. Ellison (Notre Dame, 1981), pp. 16-7. 
51 “Whole Numbers,” in Collected Papers, ed. B. MacGuiness (Oxford, 1984), p. 231 (also in Kleine Schriften, 
ed. I. Angelelli (Hildesheim, 1967). 
52 “Whole Numbers,” in Collected Papers, ed. B. MacGuiness (Oxford, 1984), p. 232. 
53 “Schubert’s Numbers,” in Collected Papers, ed. B. MacGuiness (Oxford, 1984), p. 254 (also in Kleine 
Schriften, ed. I. Angelelli. 
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unlike Frege, Aristotle allows for these abstracta to have properties of the same types as those 
that the original substances have. Thus not only is the Cube in Mecca cubical but so too is the 
cube studied in geometry. In contrast, Frege rejects Aristotle’s antepredicamental rule, that the 
predicates of the predicates of an object are predicates of the object.54 Frege holds that the 
predicates of an object are concepts, and their predicates are higher-order predicates not 
predicated of the object. Universals of the sort that Aristotle allows are objects formed by 
abstraction. Like Frege, Aristotle will reject the magical abstractions (3) leading us to Plato’s 
transcendent Forms. Yet, by ending up with objects and not concepts, Aristotle might have 
become a bit too magical for Frege’s taste. I shall not be able to discuss here how Aristotle works 
his magic. 
 
 
                                                            
54 Cf. Ignacio Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1967), pp. 52-3; 
Allan Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication (Leiden, 2000), pp. 178-85. 
